Relation between Reason, Revelation and Morality in Bediuzzaman
By Prof. Dr. Bunyamin Duran
Tuesday, 08 April 2008 17:13
Relation between Reason, Revelation and Morality in Bediuzzaman
General Principles
In order to be able to set out the relation between revelation, reason, freedom, and morality generally dispending on Bediuzzaman’s system of thought, one has to start from a number of general principles. They may be listed as follows:
- Reason is an essential means for understanding revelation.
- The worlds of existence are twofold: the external world (mulk) and inner, unseen world (melekut).
- The Divine commands are of two sorts: those pertaining to man’s actions (teşri’i) and those pertaining to creation (tekvin).
- Man’s will is relative, and therefore pertains to himself.
- Morality arises from man’s free will.
We may take a brief look at these principles:
First Principle: Reason is an essential means of understanding of revelation
What is the reason?
Men are addressed with revelational principles in two areas: one is that related to doctrine and thought; and the other is the ethical, legal, and political field concerning the relations between one another and the state. The former is more important and definitive than the latter, for it is in this field that man’s identity and ‘belonging’ (aidiyet) are defined, and his being either believer or non-believer, moral or immoral, law-abiding or rebellious, rightly-guided or deviant. Since this is the case, the defining principles in this field have to be certain, clear, straightforward, and indisputable. Limits have to be certain and well-defined. There should be nothing that leaves man in doubt. Thus, rulings related to belief should be, not variable according to persons, normative, and subjective, but binding on everyone, objective, and clear.
How can this be brought about? Is it possible to attain such principles? This is where the importance of reason comes into it. When searching for his identity, it is man’s reason that questions firstly; the principles of revelation acquire meaning after this. When a prophet makes a claim to prophethood, he is addressing man’s reason. The reason first of all tests the Prophet’s veracity; it wants him to perform a miracle to prove his claim; it considers and weighs up the prophet’s messages; if it judges that they can be verified, it believes in his prophethood, otherwise it rejects him. If belief in a prophet is not in this way but by way of revelation, the one claiming prophethood will have to give a sign as evidence; the reason will want evidence for the truth of the sign, thus it will continue in never ending sequence. Unending sequences and circular arguments are unacceptable in logic. (1)
Bediuzzaman agrees with Sadr al-Shari’a on this subject. He says: It is not only evidence of sacred texts (naql) that offers sound proof of Divine unity and prophethood, because this necessitates circular arguments (devir). For the soundness of the evidence of such evidence, which consists of the Qur’an and Hadith, is tied to the veracity of prophethood, and it is impossible to prove prophethood through such evidence. For this reason, the Qur’an proves divine unity and prophethood with rational proofs.(2)
After the reason has affirmed the Prophet, a process of intense interaction begins between the reason and revelation. Having accepted the Prophet’s prophethood, the reason examines revelation’s principles, and since it does not have the capacity to comprehend some of them, it accepts them a priori, and the rest it reexamines or puts them in a form it finds acceptable. During this process, man realizes that he has certain responsibilities since he is human, and interprets the revelational principles in this context. Firstly it analyzes man’s duties towards his responsibilities, and sees that in this process some duties are good essentially and of themselves, and some are good due to some outer quality and attribute, and some actions are bad of themselves and due to their essential character, and should be avoided, and he adjusts his behaviour accordingly.(3)
The reason’s first inescapable duty is the “affirmation” with the heart and intellect of God’s existence and unity. After brief reasoning, it sees that this is a powerful reality as clear as a proposition, and it believes in God. Since heartfelt affirmation in an inseparable sort of knowledge in man, whatever the conditions it ensures that the person is a believer in God’s sight, even if not in social and political life. But the best sort is when its inner character coincides with its outer character, and when in the name of honesty the belief is expressed verbally. In this way, the process of “affirmation” is completed with the process of “confession” or “declaration,” and the person’s identity is defined. Belief in God’s existence and unity necessitates belief in prophethood, the scriptures, the angels, and life after death, for they are inseparable parts of belief in God. As Bediuzzaman says, “... the sun cannot exist without giving light, and Divinity cannot exist without showing itself through the sending of prophets.”(4) Naturally, the creator of all things will have a messenger describe his power, beauty, mercy and compassion, and wishes and desires, and will express them through a written book. In his endless mercy he will reward those people who believe in good things and order their lives accordingly, and will punish in everlasting Hell-fire those who do not believe, and worshipping other gods, do not good but evil and harmful things.(5)
As is seen here, belief is essentially good independently of revelation, which is why, even under torture a believer should not give up the “affirmation” he has in his heart. Even if he says something contrary to it with his tongue, he is still considered a believer in God’s sight, for “affirmation” is essentially and of itself good. Verbal confession is not as important as affirmation, although it is a basic element of belief. It may be said therefore that a person may say something opposed to belief when under duress.
What distinguishes man from other beings of the phenomenal world, animate and inanimate, and makes him the most superior after God, is his ability to be conscious of his ‘belonging’. Man takes pride in belonging to worthy, superior things, and gains meaning, and in contrast, he is degraded if related to inferior things and finds it unacceptable. If he does accept it, he descends to an inferior level. This process is related to his grasping “who” he is. On his knowing that he is the addressee and most valuable creature of a creator possessing infinite power, knowledge, and will, and his internalizing (tasdiq) this knowledge, he may bring to life moral principles so elevated they make the angels jealous. By forming a relation with God and being His bondsman, he is saved from being a slave to everything other than God; that is to say, he becomes the first free being after God, but whose freedom is dependent on God. In Bediuzzaman’s words, like the beauty of a work of art displayed through electricity only becomes apparent when it is connected to the general electrical circuit, so man’s beauty and virtue become apparent through his relation with God. The person who forgets this relation, becomes the slave to numerous gods, losing his freedom while all the beauties included in his being are erased and become invisible, like the work of art being transformed into a mere lump of material when the electricity is turned off.(6)
Thus, the sense of belonging is an important human principle that emphasizes man’s humanity. Belonging is achieved through belief (affirmation). As for belief, it is of itself good, for which reason obtains it itself, without a guide. Reasonable people who live in remote places so whom revelation does not reach have to find God and believe in Him with their own intellects, they will otherwise be held answerable. For there is no need for revelation to understand and obtain something that is of itself good; man’s reason will obtain it whether or not there is revelation. Some scholars say that the word “messenger (rasul)” has the meaning of “reason” in the verse, “We do not punish a people without sending them a Messenger.”(7) So all rational people have to believe with their intellects. It is not even a question of divine intervention, for according to Sadr al-Shari’a, belief (affirmation) is a relative matter, under man’s direct control; it is possible for each person to obtain it through the use of his reason and will; Almighty God creates guidance for a person on his inclining towards affirmation.(8)
Second Principle: the Worlds of Existence are Twofold: the External World and Inner, Unseen World
Bediuzzaman distinguishes between the external and inner worlds (mülk ve melekut) and in this way solves many problems. By the external world, he means the physical, organic world, and by the inner world, the metaphysical world or “unseen.” Wisdom predominates in the external world, while Power prevails in the inner one. Causes and the laws of nature prevail over the external world, while divine power prevails directly over the inner worlds, in which the causes and laws of the physical world are not in force.(9)
According to this, the world we see is the external world (mülk). Phenomena like science, law, politics, economics, and ethics belong to this. Everything in this world has been tied by divine wisdom to particular causes. From another point of view the external part of the world of existence is the part in which man freely performs his actions. Human will is effective here and chooses freely, and his power can produce actions, so he can be responsible for what he does. To put it another way, the ‘mulk’ aspect of the world of existence is “the sphere of human transactions.” Human relations such as ethics, law, sciences, politics, and economics occur in this field within the framework of particular causes and effects. All the activities performed by man here are judged objectively, and decisions are made rationally. Everything a person does bears a particular meaning before the law, and he is responsible for all his actions. As for the inner world (melekut), it is “the sphere of belief.” Man is charged with believing that the reins of all things are in God’s hand, but in the world of human relations he chooses the best and most beneficial way to act with his own intellect and will. Of course, he has to constantly supplicate God so that he may find “the best.”
The relation of causes and effect, much debated by the Sunni ‘ulama, may also be considered within the framework of the external and inner worlds. Both the causes in the natural law, and those in legal injunctions are effective and defining in external world. Almighty God created fire as a cause in the function of burning. Fire burns. This is a necessary law in the external world, but it is not thus in the inner world. For what creates all things is divine power. Fire cannot possess any creative function. The Mu’tazilites’ mistake was to extend its function in the external world to the inner world. The Ash’ari scholars reduced the cause to a simple sign and looked on the relations between cause and effect as a simple ‘togetherness.’(10)
The effectiveness of legal injunctions is the same. Causes are defining and functional in the external world. Because of its intoxicating properties, alcohol threatens man’s reason; it is a crime destructive of man’s self, and is therefore prohibited. In this world, we realize all legal activities taking their causes into consideration, but when considering the laws of the inner world, we believe the true cause to be Almighty God.
Because, regarding this subject, the Mu’tazilite and Ash’ari scholars did not make any distinction between the external and inner worlds (mulk and melekut), one went to one extreme and ascribed creativity to the cause, and the other, going to the other extreme, considered the cause to be a mere “sign.” Bediuzzaman, who adhered to the Maturidi tradition, said with the Maturidi scholars: “that which looks to God; that which looks to us,”(11) clarified the question by making the distinction between the inner and outer worlds, and placed it within a rational framework.
Third Principle: Two sorts of Divine Command: Legislative (Tashri’i) Commands and Creative (Takwini) Commands
Bediuzzaman discovered a divine truth of great importance, and in the light of it solved a number of subjects that had been the subject of lengthy dispute and serious differences between the traditional ‘ulama. His conclusion showed both sides to be right. This divine truth is that the divine commands do not consist only of legislative commands, proceeding from the attribute of speech, but also of creative commands proceeding from the attribute of will. The latter are known as “the divine practices (sunnatullah, adatullah). While legislative commands may change and be abrogated according to time and place, the creative commands are unchanging. The verse, “No change will you find in God’s way,”(12) indicates this. These commands also possess objective characteristics in the form of principles or laws. According to the first, they are more comprehensive and abstract. Legislative laws and principles are included within creative laws and principles. Legislative principles make clear some creative principles and define them, but leave others absolute referring them to the reason. The reason can deduce these principles as it develops.
Creational laws are universal and objective. Among them are the rational, moral, and natural laws that we know, and historical and social laws.
In his famous work Isharat al-I’jaz, when describing sinners, Bediuzzaman asserts that the Divine command referred to in the verse, “Those who break God’s covenant after it is ratified, and who sunder what God has ordered to be joined and do mischief on the earth; those cause loss only to themselves,”(13) may mean creational commands as well as legislative ones. Thus, one meaning of the verse is that sinners (fasiq) cause social chaos since they disobey social and political laws, and spoil the social order.(14)
Creational laws may be obeyed or disobeyed the same as legislative laws. But while the requital for obedience or disobedience towards legislative laws is generally given in the hereafter, requital for obedience or rebellion towards creational laws is generally given in this world. For example, the reward for patience, which is one of the latter, is success in this world, wealth is the reward of striving, and poverty the requital for not working.(15)
According to Bediuzzaman, these principles are binding on everyone, believer and unbeliever alike. Those who comply with them will be successful, and those who do not will lose out. If the unbelievers comply with creational rules like working, thinking, and union, they will become strong and extend their domination over Muslims. For just as all an unbeliever’s attributes do not have to be unbelieving, so all of a Muslim’s attributes are not necessarily Muslim. The unbeliever may possess Muslim attributes, and the Muslim may possess unbelieving attributes.(16)
In Bediuzzaman’s view, all beings, intelligent or unintelligent, are compelled to comply with these principles; if they do not, they are punished. While one has to possess reason and consciousness to be addressed by the legislative principles, there is no such condition for the creational laws. Interestingly, Bediuzzaman says “feelings of compassion” are such a principle; those who do not comply with it, are punished whatever the situation. For instance, if a child kills a bird or a fly, he falls and hurts his head because he contravened the rule of compassion. Similarly, a tigress kills young antelope to feed her cubs, and because it has contravened the principle of compassion, it is shot by a hunter, and thus receives requital for what it has done. According to Bediuzzaman, the licit food of carnivores like tigers are the carcasses of dead animals; living animals are illicit. They receive the penalty if they do not conform to this.(17)
By discovering the concept of creational laws, Bediuzzaman to a large extent solved the famous vitriolic dispute among classic ‘ulama: “Is a thing good because it is commanded, or is it commanded because it is good?” He accepted within the framework of the creational laws the Maturidi ‘ulama’s assertion of “of itself good, of itself bad,” which they accorded an important place in kalam and its principles. In his view, there are things in the universe that are of themselves or essentially good; their beauty stems not from comparison with other things, but from their innate beauty. For instance, qualities such as belief, compassion, bestowal, fine speech, good character, beautiful forms, and good intention are essentially beautiful.(18) Their beauty is through creational laws, not legislative ones.
Almighty God alludes to this principle in many verses in the Qur’an. For example, with the verse “God commands justice, the doing of good...,”(19) He is alluding to the fact of justice without defining it as a concept. Here it is understood that “justice” is a creational principle. As Sadr al-Shari’a points out, this precedes the legislative command. For the execution of something that exists is being commanded. The carrying out of a command naturally, succeeds the thing that is wanted.(20) Another verse is more striking: “When they do aught that is shameful, they say: ‘We found our fathers doing so;’ and ‘God commanded us thus;’ Say; ‘Nay, God never commands what is shameful; do you say of God what you know not.’”(21) Similarly, when commanding people to avoid adultery, God draws attention to its essential quality of “ugliness:” “Nor come nigh to adultery; for it is a shameful [deed]...”(22,23) In another verse, He alludes more explicitly to the creational laws: “Say: the things that my Lord has indeed forbidden are shameful deeds, whether open or secret...”(24) Basing it on this verse, the Maturidi ‘ulama were of the opinion the prohibited things were prohibited because they were bad, and licit things left free because they were good.(25)
We may conclude in the light of the verses’ meanings and allusions that the creational laws exist and that man has to take them into consideration. Just as Bediuzzaman says that for believers to nurture hostility towards other believers is wrongful “in the view of truth,” “in the view of wisdom,” and “in the view of Islam.”(26)
Fourth Principle: Man’s Will is Relative
In the past, the ‘ulama placed most emphasis on security of life, property, reason, progeny, and religion, but in conformity with the general trend in this age, Bediuzzaman laid emphasis on human freedom. People today need to have their freedom guaranteed to the extent their lives and property are ensured, or even more.
The source of human freedom has studied by numerous thinkers from both east and west, and numerous theses have been developed. But the tradition Bediuzzaman adhered to may be said to have been one step ahead of the others. We may take a brief look of its approach.
Human freedom may be categorized in various ways: ontological freedom, political freedom, internal freedom, external freedom, and so on. Ontological freedom concerns the relationship between man and God, and the extent to which man has power over what he does, and therefore the extent to which he is responsible. On the other hand, political freedom reflects the form of relations between the individual and the state; it is related to the quality of such freedoms as the freedoms of life, thought, and belief, the freedom to study, to acquire property, to voted and be elected, and to travel. Freedom of this sort is also called “external freedom.” There is also freedom arising from the relation between a person and his own self. Man may lose his freedom by coming to be dominated by his base instincts and becoming their slave, or he may be independent and governed by his reason. This type is called “inner freedom.”
The Jabriyya on the one hand, who completely denied human freedom, and the Mu’tazilites on the other, who considered man to be creator, like God, are the two extreme approaches in this question. A middle way was sought by the Sunni ‘ulama, who accepted neither of the former. Before examining Bediuzzaman’s views on the question of human freedom, it will be useful to recall briefly some of the main arguments concerning it.
Man’s will, or his actions, the arena of his will, were the chief questions debated by the philosophers and scholars of kalam. The philosophers and Mu’tazilites believed man created his own actions independently through his power and will without any intervention of God’s will and power. And the Jabriyya scholars asserted that man has no power and will and that none of his actions are any different to the actions of lifeless matter, and so man plays no part in the creation of his actions. The ideas of the Sunni scholars, who represent the middle way, are diverse. The ideas of some, such as Isfarani, Baqillani, and Ibn Humam, were close to those of the Mu’tazilites and philosophers, while others were close to the Jabriyya. Generally speaking, those who followed the Ash’ari line were close to the Jabriyya, and those on the Maturidi line, close to the Mu’tazilites. However, it cannot be said that the former were Jabriyya, or that the latter were Mu’tazilites.(27)
It was Ghazzali who first dealt with the question of freedom in detail. He continued the Ash’ari tradition concerning the function of human will, but discussed it in much greater depth. It should be stated immediately that because he upheld God’s sovereignty against those understandings, springing from the philosophers and Mu’tazilites, that were opposed to Divine unity and limited God’s sublimity and sovereignty, he placed all his emphasis on Universal Will and Power. Man’s will and choice therefore had a limited role in the doctrine he developed. Ghazzali differs from the Maturidi approach in this respect. It may be said that the most prominent difference between Ghazzali and Bediuzzaman is the latter’s emphasis on man’s will. Although Ghazzali’s approach represents a middle way between the Jabriyya and Mu’tazilites, it in part tends towards the Jabriyya.(28)
The Maturidi tradition developed an extremely original understanding of the subject. It was first put forward by Sadr al-Shari’a, one of the Transoxiana ‘ulama, was clarified by Taftazani in particular, and favoured by the Ottoman ‘ulama. It guarantees “human freedom” without deviating into the errors made by the Mu’tazilites and philosophers, and places no limitation on Divine creativity. This understanding states that man’s will is not existent; on the contrary, it is relative and therefore accepts as basic that it may be ascribed to man, making him responsible for all his acts. According to Sadr al-Shari’a, things either have external existence and are called “existent,” or they do not have existence and are called “non-existent,” or they are neither existent nor non-existent are these are called “hall.” Man’s will is something relative, between existence and non-existence, and does not therefore have to be ascribed to God. In the creation of man’s actions, together with His own will and power, God included man’s will and power in the cause, that is, he placed man’s will as a “common” condition in the creation of man’s actions. So long as man’s will is not directed towards something, Almighty God does not create it. In this way, He built a foundation by which man could be made accountable. Man’s will can choose one of two alternatives, so he can choose what he wants.(29)
Bediuzzaman made the above the basis of his approach, constructing his thought on it. In essence, it is a question of whether or not man’s will is created. If as the Ash’ari thinkers asserted, human will was created and existent, a ‘complete cause’ (‘illet-i tamme) would be necessary to create it; man’s actions would then be compulsory, and his will would be removed. They therefore said man was “compelled [and] free to choose.”(30) The Maturidi scholars, however, stated that if man’s will was something theoretical neither existent nor non-existent, it would not need a complete cause, so could be ascribed to man. Being relative and theoretical, it could choose between alternatives. Through it, man could choose his actions himself, and Almighty God would create them accordingly.
According to Bediuzzaman, ‘particular’ will (cüzi irade) is part of the complete cause necessary for the creation of something. That is to say, Almighty God allowed man certain privileges in the creation of his actions; He wanted him to participate in their creation. Divine wisdom demanded that included in the complete cause necessary for the creation of an act are the participation of a) man’s will; b) man’s power; c) Divine will; d) Divine power. If one was missing, the act could not be created. In Bediuzzaman’s words, “Almighty God, the Absolutely Wise One, made that weak and partial will a condition for the connection of His universal will. He in effect says: ‘My servant! Whichever way you wish to take with your will, I will take you there. In which case the responsibility is yours!’”(31)
Basing his argument on this, Bediuzzaman stated that man was responsible for all his actions, so could earn everlasting Hell-fire due to his iniquities, and again through his will, could display conduct superior to the angels. (32)
Fifth Principle: Morality Arises From Free Will
Naturally, if a person has the possibility and power to make choices, he will be responsible for what he chooses and does. If this was not so, he would have been faced with responsibility that he did not have the power to shoulder, which would have been contrary to Divine wisdom. So man is able to choose with his ‘particular’ will what he wants, and Almighty God creates it accordingly. It is because of this that man is encumbered with various responsibilities and a high standard of conduct is expected of him. Almighty God designed man with emotions by which he might cultivate and develop the world, and he could display the highest moral decisions and conduct. The verse, “We did indeed offer the Trust to the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains; but they refused to undertake it being afraid thereof. But man assumed it...,”(33) which is the highest level of morality, indicates that man may undertake the weightiest moral responsibilities.
A Comparison between the Approaches of Kant and Bediuzzaman
Before discussing the various dimensions of moral principles, we should attempt to define briefly the differences between moral principles and principles that are not moral. It would be wrong while speaking of morality in the present age not to mention the famous German philosopher Kant. To recall Kant’s approach from a number of angles will situate the discussion on firm ground. It will also offer a map showing the areas Muslims may be in agreement with Westerners, who attach importance to reason.
Generally speaking, Kant’s understanding of morality is related to man’s nature, reason, free will, and God. Thinking man has a twofold nature; one side of it looks to phenomena (the natural world), and the other looks to the world of noumena (metaphysical world). The world of phenomena is the natural world we know, where the relationship of causes and effects are in force, and everything occurs within this order. Man’s instincts and emotions are subject to the formation of the relations of cause and effect. With this side of his being, man differs from the animals only in respect of intelligence; there is no great difference in respect of his nature.
In that side of man that looks to the world of noumena, the laws of reason and will govern, and these laws are universal, objective, unconditional, decisive, and permanent. It is this side of him that sustains morality and law; makes criminal law and punishes himself, that lays down unconditional moral laws and adheres to them.
The side of man that is free is this latter side. In the former field, he is tied, a prisoner, since he follows the natural laws, but in the second he is free since he follows the laws he lays down with his own reason and will. According to Kant, because this is a Divine field, there is no compulsion; those who follow its laws are sacred persons and free. For since their wills conform to the directives of the reason, they make moral decisions and act morally.
In Kant’s view, human freedom has a negative side and a positive side. Its negative side is the will being influenced by none of the natural laws. Its positive side is the will conforming to the laws of the reason, which are at the same time moral laws. According to Kant, free will and a will that conforms to moral laws is the same thing. If the will becomes dominated not by the laws of the reason but by natural laws, for instance, the human instincts, man loses his autonomy and becomes dependent and heteronomous. Man therefore experiences constant conflict between his reason and his emotions. If he complies with the dictates of reason and applies the moral laws, he will be free; but if he follows his base instincts, he will become a slave of nature.
But how can one define which of man’s acts comply with the laws of reason and which with the natural laws?
Kant developed some criteria for the subject, saying: “Behave in such a way that your behaviour may become a universal law.” This means that your conduct looks not only to yourself; you should want it to look to all mankind. If you solve your problems by lying and consider it to be moral, you have to accept that it would be morally acceptable for everyone to do likewise. But you do not accept it, so telling lies is not moral. If we express it in the concepts of our world: in Kant’s view, what man’s soul (nefs) wants is immoral, and what his reason wants is moral. For example, loving is an act pertaining to the soul, so it is immoral. For example, a person’s giving a present to someone he loves is not moral; his giving it to someone he does not like is moral. Similarly, if someone who loves this world and lives a life of ease and pleasure does not commit suicide, is not moral; he will anyway abominate suicide. But if a person who feels disgust at fortune and lives under severe stress does not commit suicide, it is moral. If a shopkeeper does not cheat a child although he could, just in order to create an honest image for himself, it is not moral, because the purpose of his act is self-interest. But if he does not cheat him just because this is a universal law, and is not concerned with his image, it is moral. Similarly, not lying under certain conditions is not moral. And it is not moral if a father tells his child: “Don’t lie and be trustworthy,” so that he should be trusted. Not to lie unconditionally is moral.(34)
If we examine Bediuzzaman’s approach to moral in the light of Kant’s principles, we may say this: the rational and moral laws that Kant asserts are laid down by reason must be the “creational laws” in Bediuzzaman’s writings. For the reason does not have the power to create; its function is only to discover and explain. It should not be expected that as a very religious Protestant, Kant should have attributed creativity to the reason outside God. He expended great effort to save religion from the tricks of the scholastics, who denied the reason and its functions, and perhaps more importantly, from the attacks of atheists and materialists. He accorded religion a very important place in his system, but expressed it in philosophical concepts.
Another point is Kant’s dividing man into mutually exclusive parts: on the one hand, his rational being, and on the other, his natural being. He did not grasp that there were tampon regions between these two sides. Because he was a rationalist philosopher, he gave excessive importance to reason, but he did not take into consideration “the heart,” which is as important as reason and at the same time has relations with the natural world. And an approach that disregards the heart cannot comprehend man in his entirety. For this reason, post-Kantian thinkers developed the idea of “geist,” which includes the heart.(35)
Bediuzzaman states that the reason and heart direct the will together, and that since man’s emotions do not foresee the consequences of whims and fears, contrarily to the reason and heart, they are influenced and affected by present pleasure. Moreover, both love and hatred are found in the heart, but whichever predominates, the other is transformed into something different. For instance, if love predominates, enmity will be transformed into pity. And if hostility predominates, love will take on the form of artifice and flattery.(36)
So what in Bediuzzaman’s view is moral and how is it achieved? It is an act performed not on account of the soul, but seeking God’s pleasure. The highest moral principle is man taking nothing other than God’s pleasure as his goal, even Paradise. Love, hatred, friendship, passion, worship, stubbornness and ambitions, and so on, should all be for God’s pleasure, and for nothing else. Basically, this is the same as what Kant called the law of reason, but Bediuzzaman calls them “creational commands (laws).”
According to Bediuzzaman, these principles can be attained only through the guidance of the reason and heart. Man’s instinctual, animal feelings prompt man only to immediate, simple pleasures. One of the most serious sicknesses of the age, perhaps the most serious, is people following not their reasons and hearts, but their whims and desires.
Bediuzzaman was of the opinion that considerable conflict occurred between man’s reason and emotions in the process of his actions’ formation, with the pressurizing of the reason and heart on the one hand, and of the animal and vegetable emotions on the other. The characteristic of the reason and heart is that they can know something unknown by deducing it from known things. That is, they can reckon what acts will have which results now and in the future, and whether they will be beneficial or harmful. They pressure the will accordingly. In contrast, man’s interests, thrills, rancour and hatred, racialism, love of nobility, ideological blindness, partisanship, and so on; that is, all his desires, can grasp only the present. Because they cannot grasp the future, they influence the will, not in respect of the action’s effect in the future, but its present benefit or pleasure. For this reason, people can commit grievous sins in full awareness of the consequences.(37)
Basically, Kant and Bediuzzaman were agreed that not being a slave to self-interest and pleasure was man’s highest moral conduct. However, in Kant’s time, hedonism and opportunism had not plummeted to their subsequent depths, and the ascetic lifestyle was continuing especially in Protestant societies, but the signs were gradually strengthening that hedonism would prevail. Bediuzzaman, however, himself witnessed the rise of hedonism and opportunism, and imperialism, their transformation into universal mechanisms, and the two world wars, the result of imperialism. Like all the people of his age, he experienced to his very marrow the tragic effects of the human will being enslaved to the base animal instincts. Because of these experiences, he emphasized this point more than anyone; he tried to demonstrate how hedonism and opportunism destroys the life of both this world and the next.
Hedonism and Bediuzzaman
In order to grasp Bediuzzaman’s understanding of morality, it will be useful to touch briefly on the growth of hedonism and opportunism in the West. The Enlightenment social thought represented by Kant looked on good conduct from the moral point of view and benefit to be identical in the attainment of man’s happiness. “The Intelligent Creator” of nature and human nature had created them in such a way that behaviour that was right or good according to the Natural Law was also, through planned coincidence, the most beneficial for the individual and society. However, in time this thought neglected the universal dimension of “good,” and embraced the concept of “happiness.” How can man be happy? Or how can he maximize happiness? Utilitarian philosophy was concerned with this question.
The English thinker J. Bentham developed a new system of thought called Utilitarianism, the basic principle of which was the necessity of individuals acting in their own interests in order to maximize their happiness. Its basic moral principle was this behaviour at the same time maximizing the happiness of all mankind. The difference between the two necessitated the principle of there always being agreement between different interests in society. For the difference between the two could only be removed if when each person maximized their own happiness the happiness of all the members of society was maximized; that is, if there was harmony between all the interests. It was supposed that this could be achieved in a society all the members of which were rational and educated. It was believed that everyone acting in their own interests was the most effective and right way.
So long as everyone acted according to their own natural instincts, they would increase their own satisfaction, and so the satisfaction of the society generally would be maximized. This philosophy was supported fervently by nearly all the thinkers of the classic and neo-classical school.(38)
The prevalence of hedonist philosophy over chiefly Western society, and almost everywhere overturned spiritual values. People started to consider permissible every way of increasing their pleasure, and they neglected to work for their lives in the hereafter.
As was mentioned above, an important part of Bediuzzaman’s work was opposing the destructive effects of utilitarian and hedonist philosophy. It distressed him to live at a time when utilitarianism, opportunism, and hedonism were made the bases of the social and political sciences. The mission he undertook as though a head-on clash with the modern social sciences. He therefore employed not only the methods of proof of kalam and philosophy, like the classical scholars of kalam, he tried to demonstrate the risks faced by the individual and society by not heeding the principles of reason and revelation and being governed by the base instincts and embracing immorality.
Bediuzzaman studied man’s psychological make-up and illustrated with numerous comparisons the consequences of man coming to be dominated by his base animal emotions. The analogy he developed in the Seventh Word is striking:
“One time a soldier fell into a most grave situation in the field of battle and examination, and the round of profit and loss. It was as follows:
“The soldier was wounded with two deep and terrible wounds on his right and left sides and behind him stood a huge lion as though waiting to attack him. Before him stood a gallows which was putting to death and annihilating all those he loved. It was awaiting him too. Besides this, he had a long journey before him: he was being exiled. As the unfortunate soldier pondered over his fearsome plight in despair, a kindly person shining with light like Khidr appeared. He said to him: ‘Do not despair. I shall give you two talismans and teach you them. If you use them properly, the lion will become a docile horse for you, and the gallows will turn into a swing for your pleasure and enjoyment. Also I shall give you two medicines. If you follow the instructions, those two suppurating wounds will be transformed into two sweet-scented flowers called the Rose of Muhammad (PBUH). Also, I shall give you a ticket; with it, you will be able to make a year’s journey in a day as though flying. If you do not believe me, experiment a bit, so that you can see it is true.’ The soldier did experiment a bit, and affirmed that it was true. Yes, I, that is, this unfortunate Said, affirm it too. For I experimented and saw it was absolutely true.
“Some time later he saw a sly, debauched-looking man, cunning as the Devil, coming from the left bringing with him much ornamented finery, decorated pictures and fantasies, and many intoxicants. He stopped before the soldier, and said: ‘Hey, come on, my friend! Let’s go and drink and make merry. We can look at these pictures of beautiful girls, listen to the music, and eat this tasty food.’”
Satan tries to deceive him, and succeeds to an extent, then the soldier hears a warning voice:
“Suddenly from the right came a voice like thunder. ‘Beware!’, it said. ‘Do not be deceived! Say to that trickster: ‘If you have the means to kill the lion behind me, remove the gallows from before me, repulse the things wounding my right and my left, and prevent the journey in front of me, then come on and do so! Show that you can and let us see it! Then say, come on, let’s go and enjoy ourselves. Otherwise be silent!’ Speak in the same way as that Khidr-like God-inspired man.’”
Having given this example, Bediuzzaman addresses himself:
“O my soul, which laughed in its youth and now weeps at its laughter! Know that the unfortunate soldier is you, and man. The lion is the appointed hour. As for the gallows, it is death, decline, and separation, through which, in the alternation of night and day, all friends bid farewell and are lost. Of the two wounds, one is man’s infinite and troublesome impotence, while the other is his grievous and boundless poverty. The exile and journey is the long journey of examination that passes from the world of spirits through the womb and childhood to old age; through the world and the grave and the intermediate realm, to the resurrection and the Bridge of Sirat. As for the two talismans, they are belief in Almighty God and the hereafter. ... As for the ticket and voucher, it is to perform the religious duties, and foremost the prescribed prayers, and to give up serious sins. ... O my lazy soul! How little and light and easy it is to perform the five daily prayers and give up the seven deadly sins! If you have the faculty of reason and it is not corrupted, understand how important and extensive are their results, fruits, and benefits! Say to the Devil and that man who were encouraging you to indulge in vice and dissipation: ‘If you have the means to kill death, and cause decline and transience to disappear from the world, and remove poverty and impotence from man, and close the door of the grave, then tell us and let us hear it! Otherwise, be silent!’”(39)
Bediuzzaman employed hundreds of comparisons in order to persuade young people in particular, and encourage them to follow the guidance of reason.
Bediuzzaman and Moral Principles
Man’s naturally not following his base animal instincts is the negative side of morality. It also has a positive side, which is man’s acting within the sphere of Divine pleasure. Bediuzzaman describes this side of it in his Treatise On Sincerity. Briefly, Bediuzzaman says in this treatise that man should perform his duty solely because it is a Divine duty and that he should expect nothing in return. The desire for fame, the ambition to be leader, the longing for success, taking an easy life and happiness as one’s goal are things that destroy morality, and in Bediuzzaman’s words “destroy sincerity,” which is a high moral principle. We may list the concrete evidences of these principles, found scattered through his works, as follows:
1. Everything one says should be true (honesty-sıdk);
2. To mobilize all one’s productive powers so that one can preserve one’s self-respect; not to live a parasitic life; not to become beholden to others, including the state bureaucracy (for example, receiving salaries, gifts, and zakat); and taking frugality and contentment as guiding principles;
3. To avoid appearing before large audiences, which encourages fame, hypocrisy, and ostentation, and not to seek appreciation and applause;
4. To prefer one’s brothers to oneself when it comes to the distribution of material and spiritual bounties;
5. To act out of love for one’s own way without displaying extreme zeal for it, and not to seek to harm the ways of others;
6. To learn the truth about people and their rights from whatever source, and to be happy to study it;
7. To consider others on the path of truth to be better than oneself rather than wanting to outstrip them and lead them, and thinking of the various perils of leadership to leave it to them and to try to follow them;
8. Not to try to gain the upper hand with one’s brothers, but thinking of oneself and them as components of the same machine to establish sincere union with them;
9. To imagine one’s brothers’ virtues and merits in one’s own self without being jealous of them.(40)
Here, I am going to examine briefly the principles of honesty, industriousness, and frugality and contentment.
Honesty in the Public Sector
At the beginning of this paper, I explained that the process of “affirmation” is related to man’s ‘belonging’ (aidiyet); man’s identity and who he is emerges in this process. But the formation of ‘belonging’ is inadequate from the point of view of the human world; it has also to be developed in society. If man lived all alone and was not a member of a human world, he might not have felt the need to disclose this ‘belonging’. But he lives in a socio-political world where there is plurality, so he is obliged to disclose it and to appear on the social scene. This is a moral and human responsibility. So man has to start the process of “confession,” that is, he has to proclaim his identity openly.
There is a close connection between the process of confession and man’s speech, his adopting a certain set of moral principles, and his appearing on the public scene and his acting within the framework of moral principles.
Man enters the public field and lives with others due to his ability to speak. The level of the relations with the real world, of the concepts expressed by speaking man, reflect moral principles. It is here that the process of confession acquires meaning and importance. How conformable with inner and outer reality are the uttered concepts? Inner reality (affirmation) requires a way conformable to itself. This way has to be set forth without distortion. This is where the principle of “honesty” comes in. According to this principle, man should appear in the public sphere through his ‘belonging’ to it. This openness is important because it is directly proportional to the possibility of people living together. Dissimulation cannot be a human principle in this context. The fact that the basic difference between believers and dissemblers lies in these three universal principles is very important: when the believer speaks, he speaks the truth; the dissembler lies. The believer restores exactly whatever is given to him in trust; the dissembler betrays his trust. The believer keeps his word when he gives it; the dissembler breaks his word.
As shall be seen, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) laid down these three universal principles as the fundamental condition of being a believer: not lying, not betraying trusts, and keeping one’s word... Bediuzzaman insisted that honesty was like the main artery of the body of Islam; if damaged, it would be unable to perform its function, and life would cease. For this reason, honesty was one of the Prophet’s most prominent attributes, and his complete avoidance of every sort of hypocrisy, artifice, flattery, and artificiality. His closest companions were called “Siddiq (Veracious),” like himself. Its opposite is falsehood and dishonesty. It is called “kizb” in Islamic literature. Besides expressing the exact opposite of the truth, it is to distort the truth in the worst possible way. It is to distort the truth for paltry benefits in everything from ordinary human relations to public relations, and to turn the truth on its head.
According to Bediuzzaman, lying is of itself bad and is not permissible under any conditions. Although traditionally it was said to be licit on particular occasions, this is not now the case. Political movements in Islamic societies and the various despotic trends inherited from the past prepared the ground for the spread of lying among Muslims; these two poles, which in the Era of Bliss were as far from each other as Heaven and Hell, have in recent centuries come to be sold in the same shop for the same price.(41)
One of the extensions of honesty is the principle of giving one’s word and keeping it. It is necessary to dwell on this a little, for the possibility of both man planning his human future, and his living together with others in particular joint fields, is based on whether or not this principle is properly practised.
Contained in the act of giving one’s word are order and stability. For since man is free, he may be able to control his acts today, but not those of the future. The upheavals in the depths of man’s spirit change and alter him continuously. He is therefore not fixed and predictable but constantly changing. It is not therefore possible for man to control, plan, and fix his future. The future is uncertain, unstable, fluid, and volatile. Moreover, although man can govern his actions of the present, he is incapable of foreseeing their effects on the decisions and behaviour of others. Thus, he is surrounded by two-sided uncertainty: on the one hand the uncertainty of not knowing what form his decisions and behaviour will take in the future, and on the other the uncertainty of not knowing how is actions of the present will affect the decisions and conduct of others. In spite of all this, he is compelled to live together with others. The realization of his own being is guaranteed only through the reality of others. One cannot otherwise speak of a human reality. So in the future, where everything is tossed around in stormy darkness, people need something to hold onto, an island, firm ground that is lit up. This island may be the ability to give one’s word concerning the future. Drawing up contracts related to the future, man would clarify his future decisions and conduct on the one hand, and on the other, if only partially he would guarantee a firm island for others.
Doubtless, the ability to give one’s word concerning the future is one of man’s most important characteristics. But another thing of equal importance is whether or not the given word is kept. We should first of all consider the nature of the word and the keeping of it: why does man give his word and then keep it or not? What does he gain by keeping his word and what is the price he pays? One a person has given his word, he has generally received in advance the return of the agreement, and used it. He will carry out in the future the return of this. The importance of keeping one’s word springs from this. The other person becomes a creditor; if it is not carried out, he will make a loss. So since the person who gave his word received the return of the agreement in advance and consumed it, or is consuming it, why does he make this self-sacrifice and keep the word he has given? The reward of his self-sacrifice is the guarantee of living with other people in order and security. If the given word is not kept, social order and organization is destroyed, so indirectly the person who did not keep his word and damaged his own interests. If this has become a general trend, there would anyway be no question of a society being made up of such people; it would mean that the power to be a society would have been dissipated. If this is an individual deviation rather than a general trend, the person whose mark it was would be ostracized by way of punishment.
As will be seen, the healthy functioning of family, commercial, and political life in society is tied to individual people keeping their words. Keeping in mind the Prophet’s (PBUH) words, we may make the following generalization: however strong the power of belief of the members of a society, the proportion of kept words and honoured agreements will be high to that extent; and to whatever extent words are kept and agreements honoured, the power of belief will be that strong in the society concerned.
Another point should be emphasized here: in the process of carrying out one’s word, people should be governed by their reasons, not by their base instincts and animal inclinations. The only guarantee of this is their not being slaves to their pleasures, thrills, interests, hatreds and enmities; that is, their having powerful belief in God. And this is possible by people being free and suffering no oppression.
The Field of Production: Mobilization of Productive Forces
One of the most obvious fields for the unfolding of humanity in this world, is man’s possessing the ability to work and produce. This is as important and influential as his ability to think and speak. Using his rational, moral, and intellectual powers, man makes a plan of production, mobilizes his own muscle power, employing other people if necessary and organic or inorganic beings, he produces something brand new and original. With these processes, man possesses resources and ability to produce innumerable different, meaningful, original things. Other than God, this ability is probably unique to man. It may be said that this is one meaning of the verse, “To Him belongs the loftiest similitude [we can think of] in the heavens and the earth.”(42)
There are two reasons man was given this ability: one was the cultivation and development of the world, and the other was his being able to comprehend the Divine acts through his own abilities.
Furthermore, man’s happiness, his receiving pleasure from life, and his adhering to it are tied to the activation of his productive forces, that is, to his working. For man’s psychology was designed in such a way that if his productive powers are not utilized and are held as potential, it is as though those potentialities rebel in accordance with the creational laws, and are not inactive but cause constant stress, distress, and pressure. Bediuzzaman’s insistence that “idleness is non-existence, and non-existence is pure evil” probably expresses this fact. He said: “The most wretched, distressed, and suffering of men is the man with no work. For idleness is the cousin of non-existence, while striving is the life of existence and the waking state of life.”(43)
When we think of people individually, we see that work is the highest moral principle, because in this way a person is himself meeting the needs of himself and his family with his own productive power, and not being a load on others. One of the most important of Divine morals is not being needy of others, and not becoming beholden to others. This is absolute as far as God is concerned, but to whatever extent man can avoid receiving help from others and being influenced by them, to that extent he will have assumed Divine morality. Since this is so, people should mobilize all their productive powers in order to preserve their freedom and self-respect.
The Field of Consumption: Contentment and Frugality
As might be expected, Bediuzzaman opposed wasteful expenditure of income and extravagance, and tried to prove that this is not natural or moral human conduct. Bediuzzaman developed the subject in the work he called Treatise On Frugality and he concluded the principle of frugality on studying many innate emotions. In his view, man has a very important innate sense, which is the sense of gratitude for bounties. Whenever a person receives a gift he likes from another person or from an institution, he feels a profound thanks towards them in his conscience, and while thanking them he feels a true pleasure. And if he cannot, he feels upset at not being able to do his duty. Man is a being who is thankful for gifts and favours. Bediuzzaman discovered the profound innate relation between the emotions, and based frugality and contentment on man’s sense of gratitude. According to him, man has an innate desire to thank his Creator while profiting from the innumerable bounties He bestows on him and consuming them. Seeing that he feels the need to offer thanks, he will naturally know the bounties’ value and give them importance accordingly. He will therefore consume them carefully and sensitively rather than squandering them wastefully.
Just as man feels deeply thankful towards his Creator, so will he feel thankful towards all the means of the bounties reaching him. The consumer will then look differently on nature, the elements, and other productive people and feel love for them. He will be at peace with God, with the natural world in which he lives, and with his social environment.
The second important innate sense is the sense of compassion. It is a refined sense that gives form to frugality and contentment and gives them content. Man is innately compassionate; he is full of pity for those worse off than himself, the hungry and the homeless. Such a person cannot waste the bounties he has when others are hungry and destitute. If his conscience is not corrupted, he will not think only of his own pleasure and enjoyment. His morality would not permit it.
Another innate sense that strengthens contentment is the sense of respect. Man is a respectful being. Worthy, meaningful things always command his respect. He tries not to be disrespectful towards lofty things. He feels deeply grieved by the slightest disrespect. When he thinks of all the bounties he receives coming from above, he feels respect for them. He knows that it is rudely disrespectful to waste them.
Another principle is that of “self-respect.” Man is a being who feels respect and esteem for himself. He may sometimes sacrifice everything for his self-respect. So long as his self-respect is intact he has a profound sense of his humanity, and when it is wounded, he feels his humanity is diminished and starts to see himself as an inferior being.
A self-respecting person consumes his income and wealth economically and is content with them; as far as is possible he does not descend to begging from others. The wasteful and extravagant man, however, has all the time to beg. In Bediuzzaman’s words: “... since [frugality] saves a person from the degradation of what is in effect begging, [it] is a cause of self-respect.”(44)
The moral principles set out above are elevated principles, which are realized in only a very limited section of society. So does Bediuzzaman enter a cul-de-sac here, like Kant? No, this is the point he diverges from him. According to Kant, the rest do not act morally, but Bediuzzaman, taking into account the structure of society, offers a graded approach for the moral principles, and opens up a moral field for them too. He emphasizes that worship should be performed only seeking Divine pleasure, then points out that only a limited number of people will reach that level, and that the rest can be encouraged by reward relative to their capacities and that they may worship in the hope of reward. Just as Almighty God promises Paradise to those who believe and do good works. Similarly, he notes that it is a social necessity for some people to enter the state bureaucracy and receive a salary, and to comply with its laws, so people may work as civil servants, but their aim should not be to command and oppress, but to serve. Again, people cannot live in isolation in society; they have to exchange gifts and assist one another, but these should be looked on Divine favours not human favours, so that no one has to become beholden to those that give. Generally speaking, everyone wants to be famous, and it is not possible to rid people of this desire. So what should be done? Bediuzzaman says that rather than trying to win the appreciation of sinners and clowns, one should do things that will deserve the appreciation of the people of reality, and win fame that way.
According to Bediuzzaman, man possesses thousands of senses and emotions, and these have two faces, metaphorical and real. Their metaphorical side looks to the soul and animality, and their true side is Divine and moral. For example, love, anxiety about the future, passion, stubbornness, ambition, and so on, have two aspects. If they are on account of the soul, they are immoral; but if they are on account of God, they are both Divine and moral.
Conclusion
Man is an enigmatical being in the depths of whose spirit many emotions clash. In the event of his will being governed by his reason and heart, he may plan and build most productively both his present and his future. He may reflect his humanity to himself, to those around him, to society at large, to the natural world, and to God. He may become a being superior to the angels, who is respectful, tolerant, beneficent, forgiving, thankful, hard-working, frugal, productive, self-sacrificing, etc. If, however, he is governed not by his reason and heart but by his base animal instincts, he may fall to the most disgraceful degrees of filth, coarse ignorance, debased treachery, injustice, trickery, disrespect, intolerance, opportunism, sacrificing everything for trivial enjoyment, thieving, presumptuousness, and the enslavement of others. He may become more debased than the lowest Satan.
The giving of reason and sending of prophets is to offer guidance to man, who potentially may do anything good or bad, and to show him the way. The great regenerators of religion and rationalist philosophers assumed this mission after the prophets. It is true that they were only partially successful in this question; morality prevailed in only a limited number of people and limited periods of time; most of the time immorality has predominated. History in one respect being “a slaughterhouse” in which good intentions and moral and rational actions were carved up springs from this characteristic of man.
Because it is very difficult to adhere to moral principles, immoral people who cannot control their wills appreciate moral people and applaud them; they even wish they would increase in number. Moral people are as valuable as diamonds in the present age, when everything is offered to the base instincts and put in their command, and trivial pleasures rule life. Governments are prepared to spend millions of dollars to raise people of this sort. But the tragic-comic side of the matter is that certain states mobilize their forces to eliminate moral people, whom they never tire of destroying. This is rebellion against reason, against morality, against nature, against humanity, and against God; it is to challenge them. However, the penalty for contravening the creational laws and challenging them is given without delay, it is given immediately. May God bestow reason on all of us!
Sources
1. Sadr al-Shari’a, al-Tawdih Sharhu al-Tanzih (Beirut, 1998) i, 406; Molla Husrev, Mirat al-Usul (Dersaadet. 1307) ii, 220; Mehmed Izmiri, Hashiyya Ala al-Mirat (Dersaadet. 1309) i, 270. For the Ash’ari point of view, which expresses a different approach on this subject, see, al-Ghazzali, Ihya ‘Ulum al-Din (Istanbul, 1993) i, 120ff.; Iji (1998) viii, 255-6 (in Jurjani’s Sharh al-Mawaqif); Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Matalib al-’Aliyya (Beirut, 1997) viii, 5ff.
2. Bediuzzaman Said Nurs”, ÜIsarat u’l-i’caz [Turk. trans.] (Istanbul: Sozler Yayinevi, 1978) 163.
3. Sadr al-Shari’a, al-Tawdih, i, 406; Ahmad Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar ‘an Fakhr al-Islam Pazdawi (Beirut, 1997) i, 272.
4. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, The Words [Eng. trans.] (Istanbul: Sozler Publications, new edn. 1998) 72.
5. For a striking study of this, see, Nursi, The Words, 59ff.
6. Nursi,The Words, 320.
7. Izmiri, Hashiyya Ala al-Mirat 1309, i, 279.
8. Sadr al-Shari’a, Sharhu Ta’dil al-Ulum, MS, (Istanbul: Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, H. Husnu Pasa Col.) 1131. 37
9. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Sunuhat (Istanbul: Sozler Yayinevi, 1977) 22-3.
10. al-Ghazzali, Tehafitu’l-Felasife [Turk. trans. Bekir Karliaga] (n.p., 1981) 159.
11. Molla Husrev, Mirat al-Usul, ii, 89-90.
12. Qur’an, 35:43.
13. Qur’an, 2:27.
14. Nursi, Isarat u’l-I’caz, 197-8.
15. Nursi, “Rumuz,” in Risale-i Nur Kulliyati (hereafter, RNK) (2 vols.) (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 1994) ii, 2343.
16. Nursi, “Rumuz,” in RNK, ii, 2343.
17. Nursi, “Katre,” in Mesnevi-yi Nuriye [Turk. trans. Abdulmecid Nursi] (Istanbul: Enver Nesriyat, 1994) 74.
18. Nursi, The Words, 647.
19. Qur’an, 16:90.
20. Sadr al-Shari’a, al-Tawdih, i, 410.
21. Qur’an, 7:28.
22. Qur’an, 17:32.
23. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Beirut, 1995) x, 200ff.
24. Qur’an, 17:33.
25. Sadr al-Shari’a, al-Tawdih, i, 410. For a summarized discussion of this, see, Oliver Leaman, Ortacag Islam Felsefesine Giris [Turk. trans. Turan Koc] (Istanbul: Rey Yayincilik, 1992) 169ff.
26. Nursi, Letters, 312.
27. For extensive information on the subject, see, al-Razi, Matalib al-’Aliyya, ix, 11-13.
28. Ghazzali, Ihya ‘Ulum al-Din, iv, 502. 38
29. Sadr al-Shari’a, al-Tawdih, i, 399ff; Sa’d al-Din Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid (Beirut, 1989) i, 399; Taftazani, Sharh al-’Aqa’id (Istanbul, 1289); Izmiri, Hashiyya Ala al-Mirat, i, 267; Ramadan Efendi, Hashiyat al-’Aqa’id (Istanbul, 1315); Muslih al-Din Mustafa Kesteli, Hashiyat Kesteli ‘ala Sharh al-’Aqa’id (Istanbul, 1310).
30. Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir, i, 120.
31. Nursi, The Words, 483.
32. Ibid.
33. Qur’an, 33:72.
34. For extensive information, see, Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals [Eng. trans. W. Hastie] (n.p., 1887) Taken from the Internet Kant site. For a comprehensive Turkish discussion of the subject, see, Takiyyeddin Mengusoglu, Kant ve Scheler’de Insan Problemi (Istanbul, 1949).
35. Mengusogu, Kant ve Scheler’de Insan Problemi, 106ff.
36. Nursi, Letters, 312.
37. Nursi, The Flashes Collection, 111.
38. Gulten Kazgan, Üktisadi Dusuncesinin Evrimi (Istanbul, 1980), 49-50.
39. Nursi, The Words, 41-4.
40. Nursi, The Flashes Collection, 200-221.
41. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, The Damascus Sermon [Eng. trans.] (Istanbul: Sozler Publications, 1996) 46-8.
42. Qur’an, 30:27.
43. Nursi, The Letters, 553.
44. Nursi, The Flashes Collection, 189ff.
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