Said Nursi and Tajdid

Details: Published: Monday, 30 November -0001 00:00

Said Nursi and Tajdid (Renewal): Changing the Public Sphere through Shared Justice

By Simeon Evstatiev*

Nursi and the Muslim Public Sphere

Great reformers have often been perceived throughout history in a controversial way by both their contemporaries and the next generations. This is even more evident when it comes to prominent religious thinkers whose ideas have often been subject to various interpretations and contradictory attitudes. Sheikh Said Nursi (1876–1960), undoubtedly, belongs to them. Because of his high erudition, his intensive social activity and his courage to publicly oppose the Ottoman authorities he was called Meshhur (“The Renowned”) and, subsequently, Bediuzzaman (from Arabic badi’ al -zaman—“The Wonder of the Age”). In 1909 he started calling himself also gharib (“stranger”) to emphasize that his way of thinking and his manners were different from those of his contemporaries. Furthermore, his “estrangement” (ghurba) was expressed also in his external appearance by wearing a gun and a knife thus reminding his Kurdish kinsmen that he was not simply a refined city religious scholar (‘Alim).

Said Nursi, originating from a religious family enjoyed a very good training in religious sciences starting with the Qur’an at the age of nine1 as well as in the field of secular sciences. Thus gradually a conviction emerged in him that progress and salvation depended on the good proportion and relation among three factors – religious faith, science and political government of the state.2 Until 1920 he had been devoted mainly to “philosophy”, as he himself called his occupation; subsequently he found out religious faith which from that moment on played the most essential role in his private and public life. Said Nursi and his essential work Risale-i Nur (“Treatise of Light”) were the object of controversial interpretations on behalf of his followers, scholars and opponents. However, this can be seen as one of the reasons which made the Risale a work which “contribute to redrawing the boundaries of public and religious life in the Muslim world.”3

The issue of the relationship between religion and politics, between Islam and public life was always significant in Nursi’s views and social activity. It is noteworthy how the insatiable desire to defend Islam originated in him, namely to explain it in a new way and to urge people to religious faith without falling into contradiction with modernity. Said Nursi was provoked by the well-known phrasing of the British statesman William Gladstone who stated that “we [the British] cannot dominate the Muslims as long as we do not take the Qur’an away from them.” Meeting this challenge, Bediuzzaman prepared a special statement which swore an oath to prove that “the Qur’an was a spiritual sun and indestructible.”4 The public significance of such views expressed by Nursi, together with his dedication to Islamic preaching and religious education were among the reasons that in 1907 he attended a meeting with another controversial historical figure—Sultan Abdulhamid II. His rule was perceived by some modernist circles in the Ottoman state as “tyranny” (Zulm) while Said Nursi passionately supported the view that Islam does not allow tyranny because the major principle for individual and social behavior should be “total justice” (‘adl):

I therefore support total justice with all my strength, and oppose tyranny, oppression, arbitrary power, and despotism.5

This point of departure explained also the fact that when Said Nursi met the Sultan, he could not find a common language with him. Kemal Karpat noted that one of the reasons was also the emerging collision between the two competing ideologies and, respectively, concepts on the role of the Islamic religion as a factor in social and political life. The things in focus here were the two forms of “Islamism” (or “Panislamism”). The type supported by the Sultan Abdulhamid relied on the Government, the administrative apparatus of bureaucracy and the traditional ‘ulama’ while the new type of “Islamism” relied of the mass movements that enjoyed the support of the common people. Deliberately, Nursi was a stake holder of the second type, which was one of the reasons for his “estrangement” from the official Ottoman authorities.

Bediuzzaman was closely related to the social and cultural context in Anatolia where despite the rigorous policy of Abdulhamid processes of disintegration took place. Although people were subject to the central authority they often preferred local sheikhs of Sufi orders (tariqat) staying just nominally under the sovereignty of the Sublime Porte. However, as in other cases in pre-modern and modern Islamic history, reforms and renewal did originate in the “periphery” rather than in the “center”. The term “periphery” (or, to use Bulliet’s phrasing, the “edge of Islam”6) in this chapter signifies the geographical and political “peripheries” but also the “internal peripheries” which might even be formally a part of a certain “center” of religious authority and political power. “Edge situations” can emerge in any historical period and geographical region transcending the temporary and local specifics of a given society. This paper argues that Said Nursi and his teachings on justice in the Risale- i Nur are such transcending which exemplifies his modernizing efforts “on the edge” in a fascinating way.

Historically, the ‘ulama’ of Islam have not been organized in a religious body similar to the Christian Church. And yet, they preserved for a long time their role of acknowledged and respected holders of authority having an enormous impact on the interpretation of the religious norms followed by Muslims in their private and public life. In the modern age the situation was changed under the pressure of factors both internal and external to Islamic societies which led to an increasing marginalization of the traditional ‘ulama’. This historically unprecedented fragmentation of religious authority in Sunni Islam particularly has been occurring since the ninetieth century onwards and resulted in a visible crisis of the religious authority and the traditional centers of Islamic learning. The shift in social values and rules removed justice (‘adl) as the key regulative principle in public life. Said Nursi drew his inspiration from the Islamic tradition where he found many proofs for the existence of a universal divine balance:

Do you wish for a proof that all things are done with justice and balance? The fact that all things are endowed with being, given shape and put in their appropriate place in accordance with precise equilibrium and in appropriate measure, shows that all matters are done in accordance with infinite justice and balance.7

Said Nursi’s insight was in the same time thoroughly modern and he was among the earliest who realized that the decline of the Shari‘a leads to the establishment of tyrannical regimes. Indeed, from the 1960s, respectively, secular dictatorships prevailed in the Muslim countries. In Nursi’s discourse one of the reasons for this would be the absence of morality, justice and virtue in public life:

Yes, just as the virtue arising from belief cannot be the means of oppression, so too it cannot be the cause of despotism. Oppression and arbitrary despotism indicate the absence of virtue.8

This appeal for more morality in politics to avoid oppression and tyranny reminds the contemporary reader that the attempt to impose the idea of modernization as necessarily requiring “secularization” is one of the results of Western colonialism in the Muslim majority world. The declined prestige of the ‘ulama’ led to the emergence of new, self-ascribed religious authorities—a tendency that seems crucial for the umma nowadays. Although many still stick to the conventional modernization theories avoiding religion and culture as modernizing forces these tendencies in Islamic societies point that the debate is again focused on the relationship between religion and politics. Within this debate the notion of the public sphere seems to be of crucial importance.

The application of prevailing conventional European theories of modernization and secularization in the Islamic world appeared to be inappropriate because Muslim majority societies have their own inherent mechanisms to build and maintain public spheres. The notion of the public sphere as developed by Habermas9 neglects religion as part of the “rationality potential” of communicative action10—an omission that arbitrarily excludes Muslim societies and communities. Here we use the phrase public sphere in its broader definition formulated by Samuel Eisenstadt11 as a “sphere located between the official and the private spheres.” His understanding makes the public sphere distinct from “civil society” because “civil society entails a public sphere but not every public sphere entails a civil society.” The development of every single civilization seems to be closely related to the specific forms in which public spheres are shaped.

Contextualizing Nursi and his Tajdid through Shared Justice (‘adl)

Powerful authority has always been considered a social necessity in Muslim societies, and political thought in Islam rejects the idea of discord within the Islamic community (umma). This has led to the aspiration of many rulers to concentrate more power in their hands. The only limiting principle that hindered this power from degrading into tyranny (Zulm) was the regulation established by the shari’a. That is why rulers in the past, when they were tempted to violate the Law, have always sought in one form or another to suppress its interpreters—the religious scholars (‘ulama’).12 Being custodians of the religious law, the ‘ulama’ have often been portrayed as anti-reformers, not so much because they opposed reforms as a whole but because they accused certain rulers or regimes of practicing “tyranny” (zulm). Thus, the notion of justice (‘adl) has always been a cornerstone of Muslim religious, political, and public life.

The term ‘adl as a noun means “justice” and as an adjective it means “rectilinear, just, and well balanced”. Both meanings are current in the vocabulary of religion, theology, philosophy, and law (fiqh). Agreement has never been reached on a definition of the term. It is what the British philosopher W. B. Gallie has called an “essentially contested concept,” for which there is agreement on the importance of the project but inevitable competing visions of what is the “best” interpretation. The Arabic term ‘adl is similar to the English word “fairness”. While implying the idea of justice at the same time means “honesty”, “objectivity” or “veracity”.13 The concepts justice (‘adl) and injustice (zulm) are one of the “key dichotomies in the Qur’an”.14 Hence, various Islamic reformers and modernists have emphasized “justice” (including the fight against “injustice”) as a core principle of their conceptions towards an Islamic revival. This notion of ‘adl is not just confined to theologians and legal scholars, but with current trends in education and participation in public debates, today engage a much wider Muslim (and non-Muslim) public.

In religious thought and law the term ‘adala has also been used with the same meaning, maintaining the separation between divine and human justice. Thus ‘adl is a leading principle for any Islamic government seeking for legitimacy in the Shari‘a. In the public view there is a strong connection between a state’s legitimacy and shared popular expectations of a just, welfare state, i.e. social and economic achievements of the particular regime are seen as an essential source of its legitimacy, and the success of social services offered by Islamist organizations at times when the state cannot fulfill its social tasks anymore.

Although “Qadi-justice” has been theorized from the time of Max Weber in the social sciences as the antithesis of the rule of law, it is exactly the opposite with its centrality in the maintenance of “largely autonomous religious institutions to a non-religiously legitimated state and its judiciary”.15 Recent scholarship has shown that public sphere is in general a site of “shared anticipation”.16 This chapter seeks to develop this notion though an examination of “shared justice” as a regulator of public and political life in the thought and public activity of Said Nursi who was one of the best examples for this tendency not only in modern Turkey but in Muslim majority societies as a whole.

As Nursi stated in his “Damascus Sermon” justice “can be achieved only through direct application of the way shown by the Qur’an”. Yet, already the “Old Said” with his political involvement emphasized that justice, which is the main factor for “man’s happiness and well-being in this world”, can only be achieved on the basis of Islamic law (shari‘a ):

Islamic society can function only through the Shari’a of Islam and its worldly happiness be achieved. Otherwise justice will disappear, public security be overturned, immorality and base qualities prevail, and everything be run by liars and sycophants.17

Thus, justice, which is seen even as one of the reasons for which Allah creates miracles, 18 is presented by Bediuzzaman in harmony with the mainstream Islamic tradition. However, along with this more traditional view, in his Words Nursi views the classical concept of justice through the urgently important in his own time issue of the rights of subjects:

Now a wise polity requires that those who seek refuge under the protecting wing of the state should receive favour, and justice demands that the rights of subjects be preserved, so that the splendour of the state should not suffer19.

It is not an accident that Said Nursi participated in the shaping of new and modern Muslim publics through the notion of justice, being inspired by the classical Islamic concept of “estrangement” (ghurba) and calling himself a “stranger” (gharib ). The Prophet Muhammad himself defined the “reformers” (muslihun) as “strangers”, “sojourners” (ghuraba’) in his famous hadith saying that “Islam has begun alone (ghariban ) and will again be alone due to the strangers (ghuraba’). They are the ones who will come after me to reform what will be twisted after me.”20 Interpreting the relation between “reform” (islah) and “renewal” (Tajdid ) in the context of this saying of the Prophet, the famous reformer Rashid Rida (1865–1935) stated that these “extraordinary persons [reformers] as a whole were alone, they were strangers (ghuraba’) in the world similar to Islam itself”.21 Modern research on Islam lays a little emphasis on these relations although their exploring could contribute in a better way to the understanding of continuity and change in Islamic history as well as the issues related to the mutual influence between the “center” and the “periphery” since “reforms” in Islam often occur in “edge situations”.

It is because of the ghurba-model and as perhaps “the only leader of a contemporary Islamic movement who did not propose political struggle as a means of social change”22 that Nursi, who considered the public sphere and the communicative action as very important for Muslims,23 in fact found himself in such an “edge situation”. He eventually became a modern reformist opposing some of the conventional ideas of modernity such as secular nationalism:

Since the principles of racialism and nationalism do not follow justice and right, they are tyranny. They do not proceed on justice. For a ruler of racialist leanings prefers those of the same race, and cannot act justly. According to the clear decree of, Islam has abrogated what preceded it. There is no difference between an Abyssinian slave and a leader of the Quraish, once they have accepted Islam, Islam has abrogated the tribalism of Ignorance; the bonds of nationalism may not be set up in place of the bonds of religion; if they are, there will be no justice; right will disappear. Thus, Husayn took the bonds of religion as the basis, and struggled against them as someone who executes justice, until he attained the rank of martyrdom.24

It is impressive how Nursi uses the examples from the early Islamic historical paradigm to explain in a modern way his socially relevant distinction between “pure” and “relative” justice. Relying on the Qur’an25, he states that “a single individual may not be sacrificed for the good of all” because “right is right, there is no difference between great and small”, and this is considered “pure justice”. As for “relative justice” Nursi clarifies that “a particular is sacrificed for the good of the universal; the rights of an individual are not considered in the face of the community.”26

Starting from the “Event of the Camel” and passing through the Battle at Siffin (657 AD) and the struggle of Ali’s sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn with the Umayyads Bediuzzaman stated that “pure justice” was possible in politics only in the time of the first four caliphs. That is why Ali acted according to “pure justice” while Muawiyya applied “relative justice” and, nevertheless, they both did not deserve punishment—their supporters will enter the paradise because they acted for the sake of justice, following the “divine determining”. This pious explanation is the basis, on which Nursi is using these historical incidents to condemn the “war between religion and nationalism” and to emphasize that for him morality, justice and spirituality have always surpassed the temporary and worldly affairs and their “commonplace governors”27—an allusion going beyond the historical examples and stressing what was on the agenda in Nursi’s own country and age. That is how he did act as renewer and reformer in both Islamic religion and society.

But what do Muslims themselves perceive as reforms and “reformationalism”? Islamic doctrine contains the idea of reform (islah) and renewal (Tajdid ) in the two fundamental sources of religion, namely the Qur’an and the Sunna. In the Qur’an islah has various connotations but very often it is used in relation to the reforming mission of the prophets who have to return their deviating communities to the straight path outlined by the Shari‘a.28 An indicative notion of this aspect is provided by the hadith (generally accepted as a trustworthy) stating that: “At the turn of every one hundred years Allah will send to this umma [religious community] a renewer to renew His religion.”29 In Islam renewal and reform have their own peculiarities different from those of the Western world. In this religiously defined paradigm the title (laqab) of a “renewer” (mujaddid) has always occupied a special place.

It is not an accident that Muslim intellectuals during the ninetieth century in their reformist efforts that imparted a new role to Islam in public life have normally avoided the frequent use of the term “reform” (islah), giving their preferences to the term “(re)organization” (nuam or tanum ). One of the reasons is that in Islam renewal is rather understood as a “restoration” or “reconstruction” than as “innovation” of new religious and social principles. The renewer (mujaddid), who, according to the prophetic Sunna, was perceived as the “centennial renewer”, has to restore the original Muslim practice thus regenerating a community which in the course of time has deviated from the straight path.30 In his way renewal and religious reform are related to two essential acts. The first one is the necessary “return” to the fundamentals of Islam—the Qur’an and the Sunna. The second one suggests the pious effort (ijtihad) of a noted individual for their (re)interpretation.

In this sense the Prophet Muhammad himself was a reformer who from the point of view of a Muslim was not a “founder of Islam” neither “laid down the basis of the new religion”. He came as a reformer in order to “restore” the original monotheism. Among the great statesmen in Islamic history the Umayyad caliph Umar II was known as a great renewer (mujaddid).31 Although for a long period of time after the 10th century tradition (taqlid ) was followed in Sunni Islam, its history knows such great renewal-minded reformers who were determined to revive religion. The activity of thinkers such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (d.1111)—probably, being the most prominent mujaddid – and the religious scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328) showed that in the pre-modern age there has always been a movement for renewal in Islam. It exemplified that the so-called “closing of the door of ijtihad” performed by the caliph al-Qadir in the eleventh century was not successful because Islamic history follows its own trajectories according to which it is necessary to periodically renew religious faith in harmony with the principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna.

Muslim authors and theologians adopted the term “renewer” (mujaddid) as an honorary title reserved only for the few worthy of it. In this aspect it is interesting to consider the famous author of the 15th and 16th centuries—Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505). In one of his works32 written in 1492 AD he explicitly expressed his hope that it is precisely on him that his contemporaries will confer the titles of mujaddid al-din (“renewer of faith”) or muÎyi al- din (“reviver of faith”) during his lifetime. Around the first day of the Muslim year of 1400, coinciding with November 21st or 22nd 1979, just at the start of the 15th Islamic century, there were also candidates for the title of “renewer of the century”. Among them were the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who had just taken over power in Iran), as well as the Egyptian reformer Shukri Mustafa (b. 1942 and executed in 1978).

Thus the historical notions and practices from classical Islam related to the notion of Tajdid founded their continuation in the Muslim majority world during the modern age too. Then it was related not so much to the so-called “high Islam” of the ‘ulama’ than with the “popular Islam” professed or interpreted by common people. The tension between those two “versions” occupied the attention of such sociologists as Ernest Gellner (d. 1995) and has influenced the fragmented Muslim public sphere until today. If we can talk of a “classical” Islamic response, then it is related to the constant process of purifying faith and return to the precepts of “high Islam”. The question in focus is always how specifically this aspiration towards re-universalization—which is in fact religious fundamentalism—should be realized. During the modern age the idea of tajdīd is one of the most frequently mentioned in the process of reshaping the identities and in the cultural “confrontation” with the West. This also explained to a great extent the relation of Said Nursi to this fundamental Islamic concept.33

Already Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti emphasized that the key element in defining a certain person as a “renewer” (mujaddid) is whether he has had “a prominent and a large influence testified to by his contemporaries”.34 The large scope and influence of his teaching were related to the fact that he did not look upon himself as a “sheikh”, but rather as an “imam”, similarly to the great medieval theologian Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624). Sheikh Sirhindi was a renowned religious scholar and a mystic of Muslim India who remained in the history of Islam with the honorary title of mujaddid-i alf-i thani (“renewer of the second millennium”) because he dedicated his life to restoring the purity of Islamic “orthodoxy” in the midst of the “heterodox” interpretations of Islam spread during the rule of the Emperor Akbar (1556–1605). It is not accidental that Bediuzzaman was compared precisely to Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi.

Nursi died without leaving an established disciple of him to continue his activity and develop further his ideas. Naturally, his followers are numerous, some influential contemporary leaders such as Fethullah Gülen confess to have learned from him. And yet, the fact that Said Nursi did not leave behind him an immediate disciple was probably one of the reasons for the fragmentation that occurred within the Risale-i Nur movement itself—in Turkey, as well in other countries among which Germany plays a special role, there are several different groups among his followers.

Some of the groups that define themselves as his followers profess more conservative views. According to others, including also the students of Bediuzzaman, he was even a “secularist”, a supporter of laicism, a democrat and a republican who acknowledged the universal human rights. These authors think that he has never been engaged in fighting laicism or secularism as some “fundamentalist” Nurcu groups tend to assert and in that sense define Said Nursi as a “modern, progressive Islamic scholar” who opposed politicizing and abuse of religion”.35

The great influence of Said Nursi as a reformer of Islam could also be explained through his view on religion and its place in the public sphere. According to him religion operates in a social and human environment and needs to take into consideration the ever changing specifics of society and human needs. That is why he criticized the traditional ‘ulama’ for their neglectful attitude toward sciences.

The most dangerous enemies of a certain society, according to Bediuzzaman, are ignorance (Turkish cehalet from Arabic jahiliyya), poverty (Turkish faqirlik) and discord. The teachings of Nursi stick to the Islamic principle of justice (‘adl) which is explained as one of the ways to solve this spiritual and social crisis. The Risale-i Nur emphasized the concept of ‘balance’ which is related to the notion of the umma as a ‘balanced nation’ (umma wasat) 36:

Criticizing the version of secularism applied during his age in Turkey which was strongly dominated by the positivist and materialist state policy, he developed ideas how religious faith should occupy its appropriate place in a modern society. This involvement in a site of “shared anticipation”, and respectively, of “shared justice” in Turkey’s Muslim public sphere was one of the reasons for his success as a leader. In the Risale-i Nur Nursi introduces the following key distinction of justice:

There are two varieties of justice, one affirmative, the other negative. The positive variety consists in giving the deserving his right. This form of justice exists throughout the world in the most obvious fashion, because, as proven in the Third Truth, it observably bestows, in accordance with special balances and particular criteria, all the objects of desire requested by everything from its Glorious Creator with the tongue of innate capacity, the language of natural need, the speech of necessity, and all the requirements of life and existence. This variety of justice is, then, as certain as life and existence itself. The other variety of justice, the negative, consists in chastising the unjust; it gives wrongdoers their due by way of requital and punishment. This type of justice is not fully manifest in this world, even though there are countless signs and indications that permit us to sense its true nature. For example, all the chastising blows and punitive lashes that have descended on all rebellious peoples, from the Ad and Thamud to those of the present age, show definitely that an exalted justice dominates the world.38

In this way, the shared anticipation of justice for Muslims in both its “affirmative” and “negative” variations is a mobilizing force for both the individual and public life. Moreover, justice implies a rich variety of connotations transcending from the realm of the religious to the socio-political domain.

Religion, Justice and the Modern Public Sphere

According to Said Nursi “Shari‘a, the path of religion, consists of 99% of ethics, prayer, the afterlife and virtues. It is only 1% of it that belongs to legal order. And this is a task of the state”.39 This indicative view undoubtedly demonstrates that without abandoning the “classical” Islamic dogma, Said Nursi was a reformer who made an important distinction– yes, religion cannot be complete unless it occupies its proper place in both the private and the public spheres. Yet, in a modern society this does not necessarily mean presence of religion in the legal structures of the state and its political affairs. However, it does mean a new type of Muslim public sphere in which “shared justice” is one of its pillars. Thus, to use John O. Voll’s term, the renewal of Nursi was a “middle way”40 which contributed to a significant change in the public sphere where “shared justice” plays a significant role.

The views and works of Said Nursi as a renewer (mujaddid) in Islam testify that in the “real” course of Islamic history the religious and socio-cultural processes are much more dynamic, complex and controversial than this was admitted in the conventional ideas as the ones of the “clash of civilizations” or the “Islamic essence”. Notions like “shared justice” as seen by Said Nursi show that all members of a given Muslim-majority society can find a common ground for “communicative action” without to necessarily contradict with modernity. It becomes increasingly difficult to outline the borders among the “civilizations” due to the processes of ‘globalization’. Islam is not in the Middle East only and it defines the course of life of the most rapidly growing religious communities in Europe and North America. What was once a “periphery” or “the edge of Islam”, including the Muslim communities outside its “central zone”, has also become more dynamic. “Periphery” is increasingly exerting its influence on the “center”—a tendency will be on the agenda enhanced by the new transnational communication and the new media. Moreover, this is also true for the “internal peripheries” in the Muslim-majority world where new Muslim intellectuals and public leaders, among them Bediuzzaman himself, have started acquiring an authority competing the traditional religious scholars (‘ulama’).

The views and activities of the Risale-i Nur movement in Turkey and elsewhere exemplify the existence of a new type of Muslim public spheres in Sunni Islam. This shows that renewal and modernization in Islam have acquired new features and have taken new courses influenced not only by the “classical” fundamentals of Islam but also by the discourses and social practices of modernity. Hence, the study of personalities as Said Nursi is facing the necessity to seek for a balance between the religious text and the socio-cultural context. The success of this balance will to a greater extent determine our understanding of Islam as a factor in the private and public life of contemporary Muslims elsewhere. Shared justice plays an increasingly important role for shaping and changing the public spheres by Muslims and is one of the major tracks for the further academic understanding of religion in modern societies.

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*Simeon Evstatiev holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and Islamic History (1999) from St. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia where he currently has his tenure as Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic History at the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies of the Centre for Oriental Studies.

FOOTNOTES

1 Şükran Vahide, Islam in Modern Turkey: An Intellectual Biography of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2005: p. 6.

2 Kemal Karpat, “Nursi”, EI2, Brill: Leiden, 2003.

3 Dale F. Eickelman, “Qur’anic Commentary, Public Space, and Religious Intellectuals”, Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi (ed.), Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thoughts of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2003, p. 57.

4 Necmeddin Şahiner, Bilinmeyen taraflariyle Bediuzzaman, 7th ed., Istanbul 1988, p. 73.

5 Said Nursi, Flashes, The Twenty Second Flash—Second Indication, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, [1995] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 226.

6 Richard W. Bulliet, Islam: The View from the Edge, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994.

7 Said Nursi, The Words, Tenth Word—Third Truth, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, [1992] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 77.

8 Said Nursi, Flashes, The Twenty Second Flash—Second Indication, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, [1995] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 227.

9 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Trans. Th. Burger, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1989.

10 Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, “Muslim Publics”, in: Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds.) Public Islam and the Common Good, pp. 3-27, Brill: Leiden, 2004, p. 6.

11 Samuel N. Eisenstadt, “Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies”, in Miriam Hoexter, Sh. N. Eisenstadt and H. Levtzion (eds.), The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, pp. 139-162, State University of New York Press: New York, 2002, pp. 140-141.

12 Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004, p. 62.

13 Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. First published 1991, New Paperback 1993, transferred to Digital Printing by Routledge: London, 2003, p. 24.

14 Jonathan E. Brockopp, “Justice and Injustice”, Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, ed. J. D. McAuliffe, III, pp. 69-73, here p. 69, Leiden, 2003; see also Roswitha Badry, “Zulm”, EI2, Brill: Leiden, 2003.

15 Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, Ithaca Press, Reading, [First edition 1997] 1999, p. 49.

16 Dale F. Eickelman and Armando Salvatore, “Muslim Publics”, In: Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds.), Public Islam and the Common Good, Brill: Leiden, 2004, p. 15.

17 Said Nursi, The Damascus Sermon, First Addendum, Second Part, 2nd edition, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, 1996, p. 67.

18 Said Nursi, The Words, Twentieth Word—Second Station, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, [1992] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 265.

19 Said Nursi, The Words, Tenth Word—Third Aspect, Istanbul [1992] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 61.

20 Cf. Wensinck, Handbook, 114 A: “Originated”.

21 As quoted by A. Merad, “Islah”, EI2.

22 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Ghurba as Paradigm for Muslim Life: A Risale-i Nur Worldview”, Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi (ed.), Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thoughts of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2003, p. 245.

23 Bünaymin Duran, „Die geistig-seelische und sozio-politische Dimension des Glaubens in Said Nursis Leben“, In: Rüstem Ülker and Aries D. Wolf (Hrsg.), III. Bonner Symposion: Gläubige Bürger in der pluralen Gesellschaft – Muslime im Dialog, Christentum und Islam im Dialog, Bd. 9, S. 55.

24 Said Nursi, Letters, 1928–1932, The Fifteenth Letter, “Second Station”, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, [1994] New (Revised) Edition 2001, p. 76.

25 Qur’an, 5:32.

26 Said Nursi, Letters, 1928–1932, The Fifteenth Letter, “Second Station”, pp. 74–75.

27 Said Nursi, Letters, 1928–1932, The Fifteenth Letter, “Second Station”, p. 76.

28 Qur’an, 28:19.

29 This hadith as narrated by Abu Hurayra can be found in one of the canonical collections: Abu Dawud, Sunan, book 37, hadith № 4278. The Arabic text is as follows: Inna l-laha yab‘athu li hadhihi l-ummati ‘ala ra’si kulli mi’ati sanatin man yujaddidu laha dinaha.

30 Esposito, John. Islam: The Straight Path, 3rd edition, Oxford, 1998, p. 117.

31 Ibn Saad, Tabaqat, vol. V, p. 245.

32 Kashf ‘an mujawaza hadhihi l-umma l-alfa (Brockelmann, II, 151, 35, S II, 187).

33 Hamid Algar, “The Centennial Renewer: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and the Tradition of tajdid”, Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford), V. 12 N. 3, pp. 291–311.

34 As quoted by Hamid Algar, Op. cit., p. 310.

35 See for example „Der Mann der Epoche: Badiuzzaman Said Nursi”, <http://www.saidnursi.de>, Visited October 2007.

36 Simeon Evstatiev, “Die Konzeption von der islamischen Gemeinde als umma wasat. Ein klassisches Fundament mit modernen Dimensionen”, Kultur, Recht und Politik in Muslimischen Gesellschaften, Band 1: Akten des 27. Deutschen Orientalistentag (Bonn – 28 September bis 2. Oktober 1998), Hrsg. Stefan Wild und Hartmut Schild, S. 337–344.

37 Said Nursi, The Words, Tenth Word—Third Truth, translated from the Turkish by Şükran Vahide. Istanbul: Sozler Publications, [1992] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 77.

38 Said Nursi, The Words, Tenth Word—Tenth Truth, Istanbul, [1992] New Revised Edition 2004, p. 98, footnote 30.

39 Tarihce-i Hayat, p. 59.

40 John Obert Voll, “Renewal and Reformation in the Mid-Twentieth Century: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Religion in the 1950s”, in: Ian Markham and Ibrahim Ozdemir (eds.), Globalization, Ethics and Islam: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Ashgate, Hants, p. 61.